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	FAR EAST	3.3	(h)(2)

Comment: It is possible that the figure 130,000 may represent the strength expected to be in forward areas in the near future. At present five of the eight North Korean Army Corps are believed subordinate to Advance Headquarters. Five North Korean Army Corps at full strength would total about 150,000 officers and men. None of the corps in the forward areas is believed to be at full strength.

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3.3(h)(2)

3. Chinese Communist - North Korean air potential:

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In an estimate of Chinese Communist - North 3.3(h)(2) Korean air potential, the Intelligence Staff of the US Far East Command states that the enemy's recent intensification of his defensive air effort along the Sino-Soviet border may be

due to the increased pilot proficiency of Chinese and North Korean trainees. The Far East Command estimates that from 150 to 200 Chinese can now be considered as qualified jet pilots. (No estimate on North Korean jet pilots is given.) It notes that the future large scale commitment of enemy air forces is suggested by the enemy's continued patient effort to maintain operational airfields in North Korea. The estimate concludes that the 'enemy definitely retains the capability of expanding his (defensive) effort over a considerably broader area, of switching to the offensive and of conducting limited airborne operations. Moreover, a sudden change in operational policy could be made without warning and at any time he so chooses.

Comment: The increased number of Soviettype jet fighter and light bomber aircraft operating within Manchuria, and the con-

3.3(h)(2)

tinued efforts to maintain air facilities in North Korea indicate Communist intentions to utilize his air force in the near future.

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On 18 April the US Air Force, Washington, estimated that there are approximately 700 enemy aircraft now operating in the Manchuria-Korea area. Of these, approximately 115 are conventional-engined fighter and ground attack planes operated by North Korean pilots. Of the other 585 aircraft, about 220 are believed to be jet fighters; some of these are operated by Chinese and others by Soviet pilots (the number of each is not known).

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	NEAR EAST		
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Iranian Minister of students:	Interior plans repress	ive action against leftis	t
	Zahedi has information that in the immediate	on Minister of the Interioned the US Embassy in diate future his father plats and universities in T	Tehran lans (a)

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to force a re-registration of students and, by this maneuver, to eliminate known Communist sympathizers, (b) arrest a considerable number of Tudeh Party members who participated in a recent parade he had prohibited and exile some of them to southern Iran, (c) install agents in the schools and universities to counteract Communism. Zahedi's son also stated that his father was angered by police inefficiency and was planning a shake-up in the police organization and in the gen-

Comment: Although both the Shah and the Prime Minister have shown a desire to clamp down on the pro-Soviet Tudeh agitators, it is doubtful that the present government is able to take effective action. Only recently the government prohibited street demonstrations; yet they have been held. Moreover, the Tudeh Party itself has long been officially banned, but its organization continues and its activities have increased in recent months.

6.	Israel	transshipping	industrial	diamonds	to	Soviet	Bloc
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3.3(h)(2)

In commenting on Israel's transhipment of priority materials to the Soviet sphere, the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv recognizes the possibility that the re-export of such items

as diamonds and diamond tools "may be reaching serious proportions". However, on the basis of conversations with Israeli Government officials and economic officers attached to various foreign missions in Tel Aviv, the Ambassador concludes that Western European countries, with the "partial exception" of the UK, have not taken effective action to prevent the re-export of their products and do not appear to be aware of the US concern over this matter.

Comment: Israeli transshipment of certain high-cost materials to the Communist world is well-known and has been periodically scrutinized by US officials. Israel has for some time conducted a flourishing re-export business with the Soviet Bloc in pharmaceutical and antibiotic materials (penicillin, streptomycin, etc.), as well as industrial diamonds and diamond tools. In the absence

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of any legal limitation, Israel will probably continue this very profitable re-export of strategic materials to the Soviet Bloc, particularly since certain Western European countries are also maintaining this trade.

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